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ESSAY
DNA DATABASE TRAWLS AND THE DEFINITION OF A SEARCH IN
BOROIAN V. MUELLER
David H. Kaye*
C ONVICTED offenders have brought dozens of constitutional chal-
lenges to statutes establishing DNA databases for law enforce-
ment. Not one has succeeded. In United States v. Weikert, the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected a Fourth
Amendment challenge from a probationer who objected to provid-
ing the government with a sample of his DNA, explaining that
the government's important interests in monitoring and rehabili-
tating supervised releasees, solving crimes, and exonerating inno-
cent individuals outweigh Weikert's privacy interests, given his
status as a supervised releasee, the relatively minimal inconven-
ience occasioned by a blood draw, and the coding of genetic in-
formation that, by statute, may be used only for purposes of iden-
tification.1
By "identification," the court meant trawling through the national
database of stored DNA profiles from offenders-now exceeding
nine million-for possible matches to any of the hundreds of thou-
* Distinguished Professor and Weiss Family Scholar, Penn State Dickinson School of
Law, and Graduate Faculty Member, Forensic Science Program.
1 504 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2007).
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sands of DNA profiles of samples found at crime scenes or on vic-
tims. 2
But how long can past offenders constitutionally be subject to this
information-gathering practice? Is there no way an offender can es-
cape "lifelong genetic surveillance"? 3 Weikert prominently left open
the question of extended retention and trawling of biometric infor-
mation. The court wrote that it was
withholding judgment on whether retaining a former conditional
releasee's DNA profile in [the national database] passes constitu-
tional muster. The distinction in status between a current and a
former offender clearly translates to a change in the privacy inter-
ests at stake. A former conditional releasee's increased expecta-
tion of privacy warrants a separate balancing of that privacy in-
terest against the government's interest in retaining his profile in
[the database]. 4
Now, in Boroian v. Mueller, the First Circuit has held that the gov-
ernment can keep a convicted offender's DNA profile in a law en-
forcement database even after he has paid his metaphorical debt to
society.5 This outcome is hardly surprising. Long-lasting, collateral
consequences of convictions have become pervasive,6 and continu-
ing to trawl for matches to unsolved crimes after a convicted of-
fender is no longer subject to confinement or supervision adds sig-
nificantly to the power of DNA databases.
Much more surprising is the doctrinal path that the First Circuit
elected to follow. The court repudiated the notion that it needed to
reexamine the balance of individual and state interests. Instead, it
reasoned that continuing to trawl the database for hits to crime sce-
ne DNA profiles did not rise to the level of a search that would be
2 By April 2011, the national DNA database, fed by records from state and federal
DNA typing laboratories and managed by the FBI, contained "over 9,635,757 offender
profiles and 370,875 forensic profiles" and had "produced over 142,700 hits assisting
in more than 137,100 investigations." CODIS-NDIS Statistics, FBI (May 2011)
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/ndis-statistics. There are no statistics that
would show how much impact the assistance had on investigations or convictions.
3 Sheldon Krimsky & Tania Simoncelli, Genetic Justice: DNA Databanks, Criminal In-
vestigations, and Civil Liberties 83 (2011).
4 504 F.3d at 16.
5 616 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2010).
6 Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Is-
sues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 457 (2010).
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subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. The court's ex-
planation of this conclusion was rather terse, consisting of but a few
sentences. This Essay starts to fill the gap in the opinion. It indicates
how the no-search label reflects a settled understanding of the con-
stitutional protection from unreasonable searches and seizures. In
this way, it supplies a deeper structure that supports the retention
and reuse of DNA profiles beyond the sentencing period.
I. THE CASE AND THE PRIOR FIRST CIRCUIT LAW
Martin Boroian was convicted in 2004 of making a false statement
to a federal official. For this crime, he spent a year on probation.
During this year, he provided (under protest) a blood sample as re-
quired by a federal statute mandating the inclusion of DNA profiles
in the FBI's national DNA database. In 2008, Boroian sought to have
his DNA profile expunged and his DNA sample destroyed. His com-
plaint alleged that the retention and analysis of his DNA profile and
sample-after completion of his probation term and without rea-
sonable suspicion of any new criminal activity-violated the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.
The district court dismissed the complaint. The court decided that
even if the factual allegations were true, the government was acting
constitutionally. First, the court concluded that the government's re-
tention and periodic accessing of his lawfully obtained DNA profile
was not a new search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Second, the court held that although a new analysis of the DNA sam-
ple could constitute a separate search under the Fourth Amend-
ment, Boroian's complaint contained no allegations of a present or
imminent analysis of the sample. In short, the district court deter-
mined that the government can hold on to the physical evidence
Boroian was required to provide as long as it wanted to, and it could
use the information it had extracted from the evidence-Boroian's
DNA identification profile-over and over, in checking profiles from
new crime scene DNA samples against Boroian's (and those of the
millions of convicted offenders with profiles in the national data-
base).
The court of appeals adopted this reasoning. Boroian explicitly
repudiated Weikert's "dicta that the government's retention and pe-
riodic matching of a lawfully obtained profile after the offender had
completed his term of supervised release would require a rebalanc-
2011]
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ing of the relevant government and privacy interests to determine
the reasonableness of the search."7 Without undertaking the "sepa-
rate balancing" demanded in Weikert, it concluded that the govern-
ment can retrawl ad infinitum. The lynchpin in this result is the def-
inition of a "search" emerging from the precedent-shattering
opinion in Katz v. United States.8
II. THE DEFINITION OF A SEARCH
Katz famously adopted a reasonable-expectation-of-privacy
standard, rather than a pure ownership or possession of property
test, to mark the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment.9 For exam-
ple, without probable cause and a warrant, the police may not place
a hidden microphone and transmitter on a public telephone booth
to eavesdrop on calls made inside the booth,10 but they may send a
business associate with the same equipment hidden on his person to
talk to a suspect.11 The difference, according to this line of cases, is
that one can reasonably expect telephone booths to be free of elec-
tronic eavesdropping devices, but one cannot reasonably expect that
an associate will not be reporting to the authorities. If an individual
has no reasonable expectation that his communications will not be
monitored, then the Fourth Amendment, with its preference for
warrants, does not come into play and the police can gather infor-
mation without any reason to suspect an individual of wrongdoing
and without prior judicial approval.
Boroian used the reasonable-expectation standard, not to expand
the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment as Katz did, but to keep
them confined. Analogizing DNA identification profiles to "finger-
prints or mugshots [that] are routinely retained by the government
after.., sentences are complete,"12 the First Circuit wrote that "we
join the other courts to have addressed the issue in holding that the
7 Boroian, 616 F.3d at 68 n.6.
8 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
9 But see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801, 816 (2004) (contending that "the
Katz 'reasonable expectation of privacy' test.., has not substantially changed the basic
property-based contours of Fourth Amendment law").
10 Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
11 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
12 Boroian, 616 F.3d at 67.
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government's retention and matching of Boroian's profile against
other profiles in CODIS does not violate an expectation of privacy
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable, and thus does
not constitute a separate search under the Fourth Amendment."13
In general, rejecting the suggestion that every trawl of infor-
mation in a database is a separate search that requires independent
justification is sensible. Once the government lawfully acquires the
information, the marginal invasion of privacy that comes from using
it later is minimal. Consequently, the government should not be
forced to use the data once and then forget it. Suppose that in exe-
cuting a valid warrant permitting the seizure of a stolen personal
computer with serial number C2011A from a warehouse, govern-
ment agents observe and record the serial numbers C2013A and
C2013C on other computers. A week later, they receive a report of a
theft of the PC with serial number C2013A. The warrant did not au-
thorize the agents to compare the numbers a week later, but one of
them remembers the number (or looks up the record of the first
search), thus linking the owner of the warehouse to the second
crime. What meritorious privacy interest can the owner assert to
stop the government from checking for a match in the serial num-
bers? Treating the simple trawl of the stored information as not sub-
ject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment-because it is not a
"search"-seems appropriate.
III. THE ACT OF TRAWLING: OLD INFORMATION, NEW FINDINGS, No SEARCH
Although no court has treated the reuse of legitimately acquired
data as a separate search, a recent article questions the view that
"[1]awful collection simply ends the analysis: anything further is fair
play."14 According to Professor Erin Murphy, "sensitive and scrupu-
lous" judicial analysis requires asking whether all the steps up to
and including the trawls-namely, "offender sample collection,
sample testing, sample retention, sample databasing, database
searching, possible sample retesting, and so on"-are separate "con-
stitutional moments" under the Fourth Amendment. 5
13 Id. at 67-68 (footnote omitted).
14 Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 Mich. L.
Rev. 291, 334 (2010).
15 Id. at 332-34.
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A mechanical rule that would exempt from all Fourth Amendment
analysis anything done with data acquired for one purpose might
not fit all situations, but a simple rule allowing reuse of data works
well enough as long as the additional interests in the privacy of the
information are either outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment
or too tenuous to justify the usual need for individualized suspicion
or warrants.
Boroian correctly reflects the conclusion that these premises hold
for ordinary retrawls of databases-both before and after the sen-
tence has been served. Despite its rejection of "rebalancing," the
First Circuit considered the impact of retrawling on the individual
interests that belong in a balancing test. Boroian explains that "the
government's [additional trawling] is limited to a comparison of the
identification records already in its lawful possession and does not
reveal any new, private or intimate information about Boroian."16
The determination that the marginal Fourth Amendment privacy
cost is absolutely zero is the crux of the opinion. If it is correct-if
post-sentence searches add nothing to the invasion of cognizable in-
dividual interests that the Weikert court already decided must yield
to the government's interests-then they also would be permissible
as part of the balancing applied to the statutory system ab initio. De-
claring that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy as to re-
trawls, and hence no new search, is not to say that anything goes af-
ter the initial cheek swab.17 It merely deems constitutionally
permissible the trawling and retrawling of purely identifying pro-
files, both during and after sentences.
But is the theory that retrawling is constitutionally insignificant
correct? Does retrawling really reveal nothing private or intimate
about the individual? The court stopped with the observation that
continued trawls generate no new information about the structure
of the past offender's DNA. But surely retrawls could reveal things a
person would rather keep private. For example, an individual whose
DNA profile is in the database-a database inhabitant, so to speak-
might well be concerned that later trawls will expose him as the
perpetrator of an unsolved crime. A later trawl with this outcome
16 616 F.3d at 67.
17 It lends no legitimacy to producing an army of clones from the lawfully acquired
sample, to use Professor Murphy's fanciful example, supra note 14, at 335, that resides
at least a galaxy away from the Fourth Amendment.
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certainly would harm the database inhabitant. But this kind of harm
cannot count in any Fourth Amendment calculus. By itself, the dis-
covery that an individual is responsible for a crime does not infringe
a legitimate interest, let alone an interest that the Fourth Amend-
ment respects. 18 The Fourth Amendment does not protect infor-
mation per se. It protects individuals against oppressive methods
for acquiring that information1 9
A slightly more plausible argument for Fourth Amendment pro-
tection is that retrawls expose database inhabitants to at least a
small risk of becoming suspects even if they are innocent of new
crimes. A false incrimination could occur if the database inhabitant
is not the source of the crime scene DNA, but coincidentally shares
that DNA profile. For full profiles, the probability of such sharing is
minuscule, but when the crime-scene DNA is highly degraded (and
hence ambiguous), a match is less definitive.2 0 A false hit also could
occur if the past offender is indeed the source but the police or
someone else planted his DNA at the crime scene.21
This argument also fails, for much the same reason. The individu-
al interest in being free from falsely incriminating trawls is legiti-
mate enough, but it too does not count in the Fourth Amendment
calculus. The false-incrimination objection to DNA database trawls
goes not to the impact of the information-gathering technique on
privacy, but to the accuracy of the inferences that can be drawn
from the information. For better or worse, the Fourth Amendment
does not protect against mistaken reasoning about evidence. In a
classic search of a home, police also could find planted contraband
or ambiguous evidence. It is enough that police, in the judgment of a
magistrate issuing a warrant, have a sufficient basis to believe that
the search will produce potentially useful information. The Fourth
Amendment protects certain kinds of privacy, such as the undis-
turbed possession or enjoyment of one's dwelling. It does not pro-
tect against mistaken inferences from the fruits of a search, whether
18 See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
19 Compare Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886) (describing the Amend-
ment as protecting information in the form of business records), with Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (moving away from Boyd's information-centric perspective).
20 David H. Kaye, The Double Helix and the Law of Evidence (2010).
21 See, e.g., David H. Kaye et al., The New Wigmore, A Treatise on Evidence: Expert
Evidence § 13.3.1 (2d ed. 2011).
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warranted or warrantless. Consequently, the risk of a falsely incrim-
inating trawl does not undercut Boroian's conclusion that weekly
trawls of a DNA database are not "separate... search[es]."22
Still, a database inhabitant also could complain that forging the
link to the new crime scene invades the distinct interest in keeping
one's whereabouts secret. An individual's concern with spatial pri-
vacy seems to sit more comfortably within the Fourth Amendment
than the desire for freedom from prosecution or inferential accura-
cy. In United States v. Karo, for example, the Supreme Court held that
planting a beeper in a container of ether and tracking the contain-
er's movements through houses and other locations constituted a
search. 23 A database trawl might produce a match to DNA recovered
from the bedroom of a murdered woman, which in turn, might lead
to the discovery that the database inhabitant was having an affair
with her. Boroian's assurance that "the government's use of [the da-
tabase] does not reveal any new, private or intimate information" 24
now seems less reassuring.
Nonetheless, trawling differs from the investigatory technique in
Karo, and the Supreme Court never has viewed the Fourth Amend-
ment as protecting mere information about a person's locations.
"Staking out" a suspect's residence and "tailing" him give the police a
record of the individual's movements, but that does not make these
time-honored practices "searches" that trigger Fourth Amendment
protections. Only when the government has entered-physically or
technologically-spaces cloaked in a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy has the Court treated the gathering of intelligence about the lo-
cations of people or objects as a search.2 5 just because police inves-
tigations establish that individuals visited certain places at certain
times does not mean that they implicate a reasonable expectation of
privacy. It is one thing to place a television monitor in a bedroom, as
22 Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2010).
23 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
24 616 F.3d at 67.
25 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2000); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705 (1984).
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in Orwell's 1984.26 It is another to discover trace evidence that might
have come from an intruder in the same bedroom. 27
Boroian's insistence that later inspection of recorded biometric
information is not a new search is thus one viable route to the con-
clusion that "the state need not destroy records of identification-
such as fingerprints, photographs, etc.-of convicted felons, once
their sentences are up."28 This conclusion often is taken for granted,
but the permissibility of reusing information is a consequence, and
not an axiom, of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In Boroian, the
First Circuit offered a somewhat superficial justification for rejecting
the attack on post-sentence DNA trawling. Other courts have done
the same. Relating the no-new-search theory to the range and na-
ture of the interests cognizable under the Fourth Amendment pro-
vides a deeper structure for the position that retrawls are not new
searches that require probable cause, warrants, or other Fourth
Amendment protections. 29
26 Or even to use GPS devices to monitor every movement of a suspect's car every
minute of every day. One circuit court has held that this practice constitutes a search.
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555-56 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
27 But cf. Tovia Smith, Critics Challenge Familial DNA Testing, NPR (Feb. 28, 2007),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId-7641971 (quoting Tania Si-
moncelli as referring to "cameras in everybody's living rooms" in arguing against kin-
ship searches with DNA databases).
28 United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 86 (2d Cir. 2007). A biometric-identification
exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements for acquiring and using
DNA profiles also would support the result in Boroian-and avoid the instability in
Fourth Amendment doctrine caused by the "totality of the circumstances" balancing
test used in Weikert (and derived from the Supreme Court's decision in Samson v. Cali-
fornia, 547 U.S. 843 (2006)). See David H. Kaye, Who Needs Special Needs? On the Con-
stitutionality of Collecting DNA and Other Biometric Data from Arrestees, 34 J.L. Med. &
Ethics 188, 192-95 (2006) (proposing such an exception).
29 That the Fourth Amendment allows indefinite retention of records is not to say
that there should be no time limit on the practice.

